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CORRESPONDENCE 
Prejudice, Politics, and Proof 
Peter Tillers* 
In the last fifteen years there has been a great resurgence of interest 
in fundamental theoretical analysis of the nature of factual proof in 
litigation. Many serious scholars, both in the law school world and 
outside it, have turned their energies in this direction. William L. 
Twining, Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College 
London, has been a major figure in this growing movement. He re-
cently published a painstaking and scholarly study of Bentham's and 
Wigmore's theories of evidence, inference, and proof in adjudication. t 
This book is part of Twining's broader, long-term effort to develop a 
general theoretical framework for the analysis of evidence and proof. 
Professor Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., recently published a vile re-
view of this book in the Michigan Law Review. 2 Graham's attack on 
Twining's effort is not the usual trashing sometimes found in law re-
views. He does not claim that Twining's book is poor scholarship.3 
Graham does make it plain that he does not like either Twining or his 
book and he does his damnedest to make his readers share his senti-
ments. Graham is entitled to dislike any book or person he pleases, 
but the polemics in his review are both thoughtless and offensive. 
Persons familiar with Graham's work know that it contains a great 
deal of vitriol. This review is no exception. He speaks, for example, of 
"sneering pseudo-Englishmen" and "effete Eastern anglophiles"4 and 
he refers to Bentham's critique as "proto-Stalinist."5 Ironically 
enough, part of Graham's distaste for both Bentham and Wigmore 
seems to rest on his dislike of their polemics. For example, he appar-
ently agrees with John Chipman Grey's view that Wigmore's abusive 
* Professor of Law and Director, Program for Evidence in Litigation, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 1966, Yale University; J.D. 1969, LL.M. 1972, 
Harvard Law School. - Ed. 
1. See w. TwINING, THEORIES OF EVIDENCE: BENTHAM AND WIGMORE (1985). 
2. See Graham, "There'll Always Be an England'~· The Instrumental Ideology of Evidence 
(Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV. 1204 (1987). 
3. See id. at 1207 (fwining's book is "strong on Bentham, weak on Wigmore, provocative on 
everything else."). 
4. Id. at 1205. 
5. Id. at 1214. 
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language shows "bad grace."6 Graham is not well positioned to ac-
cuse anyone of bad grace. Graham draws back from putting Wigmore 
and Bentham into Bentham's category of "vituperative personalities,"7 
one rather suspects because he realized this characterization would 
make him their spiritual ally. 
As irritating as they are, Graham's "extreme polemical tones"8 are 
not the primary reason for my characterization of his review as 
thoughtless and offensive. One major fault in the review is shabby 
scholarship. Graham's concession that there is "silly stuff'' in his re-
view9 is accurate but insufficiently comprehensive; there is sophomoric 
stuff throughout. Another major fault is that the review is fiercely 
derisive. Graham is overtly anglophobic and his dislike of Twining 
and Twining's work rests on that anglophobia. Moreover, his review 
contains several personally demeaning and offensive remarks about 
Twining. Graham tries to make this vile brew palatable by packaging 
it in witty and camp discourse; by saying "da-da-da-da-da-da-da-da-
da"10 he hopes, I gather, that readers will chuckle at his prejudice, his 
mean-mindedness, and his contempt for scholarship, William Twin-
ing, and everything English. 
Graham's "Anglo-bashing"11 seems to have its source in anglo-
phile-phobia. He tells us that his "major concern is with the impact of 
... [Twining's] imperialist ideas on those political pubescents in this 
country who continue to believe in the cultural superiority of Eng-
land."12 He detests "American Anglophiles,"13 particularly those at 
Harvard Law School and at "petty Harvards."14 Perhaps this animus 
explains the personal abuse he heaps on Twining. To judge by his own 
expre~sions of sympathy for "despised ethnics" in the United States, 15 
Graham probably would not call a black man "my boy," but he is 
willing to refer to Twining as "our boy."16 Graham also strongly im-
plies that Twining's motive for the study of evidence is the desire for 
"personal power and profit."17 
6. Id. at 1226. 
7. Id. at 1227. 
8. Id. at 1226 (referring to a reviewer's comment about Bentham). 
9. Id. at 1217. 
10. Id. at 1225. 
11. Id. at 1206. 
12. Id. at 1234. 
13. Id. at 1206. 
14. Id. at 1205. 
15. Id. at 1205-06. 
16. Id. at 1208. 
17. See id. at 1230-31. 
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Graham's intense dislike of anglophiles (and his consequent dislike 
of everything English) may explain why he accuses Twining of having 
"imperialist ideas."18 We can see the logic of his position: (1) I hate 
American Anglophiles (at Harvard) (most of whom are dead); 
(2) therefore, I hate England; and (3) therefore, I hate Twining, who 
- though he is cosmopolitan and open to American (and Continental) 
theorizing, has urged English law teachers to become less parochial, 
and sees Karl Llewellyn as a guiding light - is, after all, English. 
Graham professes to have a benign form of anglophobia. He as-
serts that he does not want to show the inferiority of the English; he 
only wants to show that Americans, particularly "despised ethnics," 
are just as good as the English.19 In defense of these despised ethnics, 
Graham notes that "their remote ancestors had . . . civilizations at a 
time when the denizens of the British Isles were still enthusiastically 
eating one another."20 Graham's "argument" echoes Churchill's war-
time defense of the racial superiority of the English over the Germans. 
His reasoning also implies that a good many "ethnics" are less genteel 
and civilized than Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., who is of "Celto-Slavic 
ancestry."21 The ancestors of some ethnics were eating pigs while 
Graham's were doing more refined things. 
Only Graham's anglophile-phobic-anglophobia explains how he 
was able to conclude that Twining is a cultural imperialist. Graham's 
choice of Twining as a symbol of English cultural smugness is queer: 
it is roughly comparable to taking Averell Harriman as a symbol of 
American belief in a uniquely American cultural heritage. Twining 
has been tireless in his efforts to break down the insularity of English 
legal academics. He has repeatedly exhorted evidence scholars in the 
United Kingdom to become less insular and to pay more attention to 
American and Continental theorizing. I might also note that an Eng-
lish cultural imperialist is an unlikely general editor of a series - The 
Jurists- that includes or will include books on Hayek, Weber, Hegel, 
Fuller, and Kelsen. Twining himself (as Graham acknowledges) 
wrote a book about Karl Llewellyn. (Twining wrote the book practi-
cally in a fit of pique at the refusal of the Times of London to publish 
an obituary about a "minor" American legal theorist.) Perhaps Gra-
ham can show us how all of these activities are part of a clever plot to 
propagate the cultural superiority of England? 
The only benign explanation I can offer for Graham's charge of 
18. Id. at 1234. 
19. Id. at 1206. 
20. Id. at 1205. 
21. Id. at 1204 n.*. 
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cultural imperialism is Graham's assumption that adherents to the 
"rationalist" tradition in evidence scholarship - in Graham's words, 
"the instrumental ideology of evidence" - are pro tanto English cul-
tural imperialists, that anyone who shares the views of figures such as 
Bentham and Wigmore must be an English imperialist. This is a hard 
pill to swallow. Be that as it may, it is pertinent to noj:e that Twining 
has strongly challenged the "rationalist" or "instrumentalist" thesis 
that the only purpose of proof process is the discovery of factual truth. 
It is also pertinent to note that, although Twining plainly admires 
much that he finds in the rationalist tradition, he generally bemoans 
rather than celebrates the homogeneity of American and English theo-
rizing about evidence. I noticed, even if Graham did not, that Twi-
ning had favorable things to say about the work of Abu Hareira (who 
decidedly is not English), partly because Twining believes that Abu 
Hareira drew on intellectual currents entirely outside the British em-
piricist tradition. 
Graham is not more attentive to tiresome details when he speaks of 
"Twining and his cohort of pseudo-mathematical truth-seekers."22 
Graham apparently does not know - why let facts get in the way of a 
good phrase? - that Twining has never used mathematics to analyze 
evidence and that he has made strong arguments in favor of a theory 
of proof (L.J. Cohen's "Baconian" theory) that he sees as 
nonmathematical. Graham also seems to assume that "pseudo-mathe-
matical truth-seekers" such as David Kaye and Richard Lempert be-
long in Twining's "cohort." This implication is absurd. Lempert and 
Kaye work within a theoretical perspective (Bayesianism) that is quite 
different from Twining's "Baconian" approach; it is rather unlikely 
that they think of themselves as Twining's disciples or his spiritual and 
intellectual brethren. In short, Graham's asides reveal that he blurs 
some rather wide differences among theorists of proof. 
Graham has set out to destroy an enemy - theorists of proof -
with one blow. He cannot do that easily because he does not know his 
enemy; his ignorance prevents him from realizing that he has many 
enemies and that it takes different kinds of blows to kill them. Con-
sider just one example of an "argument" (really only a theoretical ri-
poste) by Graham against theorists of proof. He tells us that "ultimate 
reality (if not entirely a construct of the human mind) is altered by our 
attempts to perceive it (a thought frightful to ponder for theorists of 
'proof')."23 Although Graham, having relieved himself of the tire-
22. Id. at 1224. 
23. Id. at 1225. 
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some (some would say scholarly) obligation of documenting his 
claims, thankfully does not drop the obligatory citation to Thomas 
Kuhn, it seems apparent that he thinks that theorists of proof have not 
thought about the constructed character of evidence and reality. 
Which theorists of proof does he have in mind? Does he suppose that 
L.J. Cohen, one of the world's leading philosophers of science, has not 
thought about how "ultimate reality ... is altered by our attempts to 
perceive it"? I have not taken the trouble to reread Cohen's works but 
I am quite sure that he knows the work of theorists such as Thomas 
Kuhn and scientists such as Heisenberg. Does Graham suppose that 
Bayesians such as Lempert have not pondered the way the mind 
shapes "reality"? Apparently he does not know that almost all Bayes-
ians in the law-school world favor "subjective Bayesianism," which 
largely sprang from the work of de Finetti, who vigorously insisted 
that the mind structures experience, that subjective Bayesianism is a 
(logical) way of structuring evidence, and that no evidence is simply 
"given." Perhaps Cohen and other "Baconians" do not emphasize the 
constitutive activities of the mind to the same degree, but as far as 
Graham is concerned, all theorists of proof - Baconians, Bayesians, 
fuzzy set theorists, holists, cognitive psychologists, and the rest of 
them - are one and the same. A plague on their house! Or should it 
be "houses"? 
How is one to explain these crudities? Has Graham adopted the 
view that trashing is scholarship? Or is he bewildered by things that 
he does not understand and fearful of becoming just a crotchety old 
fossil? In Graham's words, "What's it all about, Alfie?"24 The kind of 
rhetoric used in the review suggests that Graham's philistinism and his 
vision of politics in litigation are to blame for the indiscriminate char-
acter of his attacks. 
Professor Graham has a great dread of anything that reeks of sci-
ence, mathematics, and logic. I am not sure if Graham wants to re-
move chemistry, biology, and geometry from the curricula of our high 
schools,25 but he apparently does want to keep science and mathemat-
ics out of the courtroom. Graham makes the relatively restrained - I 
would not say "considered" - claim that " 'science' [the quotation 
marks are his] on the forensic stage is only a pretense."26 So throw 
chemistry out of the courtroom. If not chemistry, then logic and 
mathematics. Is he serious? (It's not easy to tell.) Mathematics, of 
24. Id. at 1209 (quoting lyrics of a sentimental popular song). 
25. But he may. See id. at 1225 (suggesting that scientific inquiry is fruitless because nature 
is a "wily woman" who is "[e]lusive and without the Truth in Her"). 
26. Id. at 1233 (emphasis added). 
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course, can be put to bad use in the courtroom. But it can also be 
enlisted in the effort to show that cigarette companies are killing off 
large numbers of people or that some employers systematically dis-
criminate against certain ethnic groups (possibly even against people 
of Celto-Slavic ancestry). The view that science and mathematics are 
bad in the courtroom simply because they are scientific and mathemat-
ical seems philistine.· 
Perhaps there is a more charitable way of describing Professor 
Graham's cast of mind; perhaps I should call him a politically moti-
vated irrationalist rather than a philistine. In place of the rationalist 
"ideology of evidence" (as he construes it), he offers (without overtly 
embracing) a competing vision of evidence and proof in litigation. He 
offers a "theatrical vision of litigation";27 he wants us to view "litiga-
tion as political theatre" [sic].28 This vision of litigation is bound to 
appeal to once-junior radicals who have not yet given up the cliche 
that everything is politics. Be that as it may, Graham does demand 
fairness in litigation.29 Fairness, however, seems to have nothing to do 
with factual accuracy; the importance of factual accuracy is attribut-
able to nothing more than political ideology.30 I suppose Graham 
thinks that it is fair to convict a person for a crime he did not commit. 
It's just all politics, isn't it? 
Let me try to reduce Graham's errors to more manageable propor-
tions. Let me say that his argument against rationalism in evidence 
and proof rests on two central premises: (1) litigation is not just the 
pursuit of factual truth; litigation serves many other social, moral, 
political, and ideological purposes; and (2) the process of construing 
evidence involves many ineffable factors that cannot be captured by 
rational, logical, mathematical, or scientific theory. These are respect-
able claims and there is something to them. However, there is not as 
much to them as Graham supposes; these claims may be true but they 
do not support Graham's view of the insignificance of either factual 
accuracy or rigorous theorizing about proof. 
By now it is a truism, and it has been a truism for quite some time, 
that litigation is not just a search for the truth. Charles Nesson said 
this sort of thing recently, William Twining has made this point re-
peatedly, and Wigmore (along with many others) made the same point 
a long time ago. It is easy, however, to slip from this truism to the 
different and far more dubious proposition that litigation serves social 
27. Id. at 1232. 
28. Id. at 1233. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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purposes and values rather than truthfinding. Simply put, the fact that 
litigation is used to serve a variety of purposes does not and should not 
mean that the value of factual truth has no role in litigation; to say, for 
example, that litigation serves expressive functions does not necessar-
ily mean that we do not and should not use litigation to find out what 
actually happened. The issue is how we reconcile and meld the various 
functions of litigation, not whether we should choose truth or some-
thing else as the goal of litigation. 
Graham is also not entirely off the mark in insisting that proof 
processes and inference cannot be fully dissected by rational analysis. 
He may be trying to say that there are things at work in inference that 
are hard to understand and that we are usually or always better off in 
letting our common intuitions guide our factfinding rather than in try-
ing to construct a priori factfinding techniques that are supposedly 
more logical. He may well be right, but in choosing to defend this 
thesis by attacking logical, rational, and mathematical analyses of 
proof he has again chosen the wrong target. It is entirely possible to 
use the language of mathematics or logic to study evidence, inference, 
and proof without any commitment to the absurd idea that factfinding 
in trials should be governed by a "mathematico-verbal monarch"31 or 
even by mathematical equations purportedly describing the probative 
force of evidence. To the extent that Twining recommends that liti-
gators use charts to analyze evidence, he is of course fair game for 
skeptics such as Graham, but Graham apparently has made the com-
mon mistake of equating mathematical or logical analysis as an ex-
ploratory tool with the application of mathematical, logical, or formal 
analysis in real-world situations. 
I do not wish to denigrate the motives that seem to underlie the 
rhetoric in Graham's review, particularly since I think I share some of 
Graham's ideals and values (and some of his resentments). Nonethe-
less, I hope - I have to hope - that deep commitment to ideals and 
values is not bound to produce the sort of unwitting cruelty so evident 
in Graham's review; I want to believe that in scholarship we do not 
have to take the view of generals in war - that we have to kill some 
noncombatants along the way. In any event, I think that Graham has 
done nothing but harm to the causes that he believes in. The shame of 
it all is that Graham could have made a much more intelligent and 
effective case by approaching the literature on evidence, inference, and 
proof with a more open mind. There is no monolithic theory of proof 
today; there are deep divisions of opinion on almost all of the funda-
31. Id. at 1231. 
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mental questions. It is a shame that Professor Graham, like 
Thrasymachus, does not want to participate in the discussion. His 
political, irrationalist, and subjective perspective has much to offer -
if he takes the trouble to inform himself about what is at stake in the 
debates about proof. 
